History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but
that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor,
who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march
straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier
being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a
movement, or even the semblance of it, must perforce draw the
British and native armies to that side; and then Soult, coming down
to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with
Victor’s by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as
occasion offered.
Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources
of the English general were,--
1º. His central position.
2º. His own British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in
number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants,[6]
amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred
horses and mules.
3º. The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be
organised and armed about sixteen thousand.
Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of
being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego;
and beyond the latter river, Trant and Sylveira commanded separate
corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.
4º. The militia and the _ordenanzas_, which may be denominated the
insurgent force.
5º. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes,
Peniché, and Badajos.
6º. The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of
the coast and river navigation for his supplies.
7º. The assistance of Cuesta’s army, which amounted to thirty
thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry; of which twenty-five
thousand were actually at or in front of the defile of Monasterio,
close to Victor’s posts. Sir Arthur Wellesley’s moral resources
were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity;
the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the
presentiment of victory; and a mind equal to the occasion.
In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because
he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat
would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to
the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be
brought to bear against him.
On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the
chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in
possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming
a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were
greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto; and their desire to regain
it was strongly expressed.
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