3º. When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error; but when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy’s forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour. It was not general Loison’s fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal. MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL. 1º. If sir Arthur Wellesley’s operation be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river--caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage. 2º.--Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the general; that he was quick to see, and active to strike; and, first, the secresy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were many obstacles to overcome; and D’Argenton, as the sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur’s combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort, for, it must be recollected, that this rapid advance against an eminent commander, and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, were in a state of open mutiny.