History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than
more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow
preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of
Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted; and yet, during
that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only
restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen,
and the energy of Sallicetti, the minister of police. We have
seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops
in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the
representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make
this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or
good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal,
but with that palpable and direful ministerial incapacity which
suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and
dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects,
while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was
left without an adequate force.
For the first time since the commencement of the Peninsula war,
sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were
collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a
British force. For the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny
of France, the principal army of that country had met with an
important check: the great conqueror’s fortune seemed to waver, and
the moment had arrived when the British government was called to
display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed
his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all
disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers;
but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating
them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur
Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on
the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding
them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of
the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve
millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while
sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken
all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for
orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other
to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the
Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted
policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence,
or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of
him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, even under the
burden of their folly?
BOOK IX.
CHAPTER I.
CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.
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