History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
In the foregoing book the real state of affairs in the Peninsula
has been described; but it appeared with a somewhat different
aspect to the English general, because false informations,
egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to
mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied
nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable
confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters,
describing the enemy’s misery and fears: nor was the camp free
from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous
of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos
that Soult’s force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks,
was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay,
sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the
tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps,
also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not
free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come.
The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate
for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support;
and the English general was as eager, for he was at the head of
gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt
that, if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British
army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir John
Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near
Lisbon, until it became the scorn of the French, and an object of
suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.
There were three lines of offensive operations open:--
1º. _To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta’s army, and, making Elvas and
Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front._ This line
was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover his front by the
Tagus; the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the
Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between
Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; and strong detachments must
have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of
the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the duke of Belluno
and Soult being free, Beresford’s corps would have been endangered.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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