could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly, but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution to go no farther, nay, even _to withdraw from Spain altogether_. It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, Cuesta’s conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement; but the faithless and perverse conduct of the supreme junta, although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the measure even of Cuesta’s obdurate folly. That body, after having agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph; and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part, arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be a master stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat; hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers elsewhere. As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur’s remonstrances drew forth many official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thought it necessary to make some apology for himself, asserting that the evil was deep rooted, and that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated; and yet Mr. Frere, who could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was really within his province, thought himself competent to direct all the operations themselves which were in the province of the generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to insult sir John Moore; to pester sir John Cradock with warlike advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur Wellesley’s army, without that officer’s concurrence. CHAPTER II.