History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little
impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him,
and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the
view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in
the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of
military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur;
who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as
possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that
the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of
his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and
being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued
them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road
of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with
pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and
marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th he discovered that he had
been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing
the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke,
with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across
the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with
respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support
the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir
Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d.
But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance
of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of
the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this
complicated campaign.
The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch
from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the
supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders
to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English.
“_Wellesley_,” said Napoleon, “_will probably advance, by the
Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on
his flank and rear, and crush him_;” for, at that distance, and
without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this
allknowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and
as certainly as those who projected them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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