The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General Campbell’s division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left; general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, but arranged on one line only, because general Mackenzie’s division, destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was intended that general Hill’s division should close the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 11.] The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain; and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British cavalry was with general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men; but they had seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, nearly fifty thousand men, of which above seven thousand were cavalry. But what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand. [Sidenote: Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS.]