1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all may be too little. Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so commenced his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative. 2º. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin’s, and the half of Villatte’s division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before Soult reached Plasencia.