History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English
government and the English public that they had taken a false view
of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river;
but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that
marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight
of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French
emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established
a second line of retreat upon Gallicia, and he kept a watchful eye
upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult’s
corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected
storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved
himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente
was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon,
and, the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a
battle, embarked.
It was objected--1º. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;--2º.
That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at
Lugo, instead of at Coruña;--3º. That he overrated the strength
of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the
Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the
opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a
battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been
gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy’s
power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.
Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great,
that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be
relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as
a principal force; and that the native armies being all dispersed
before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too
strong to contend with single handed; wherefore, it was prudent
to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be
conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to
give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final
success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions
of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English
ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent
an auxiliary army to Spain; although the system still existed which
he had denounced as incompatible with success.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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