History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the
Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish
armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French,
had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long-cherished
delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency,
was at last dissipated. The transactions of the campaign of 1809
form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All
the objections which had been made to sir John Moore’s conduct,
being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while
the soundness of that general’s views were confirmed in every
particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking
resemblance to each other.
Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from
Portugal to _aid the Spanish armies_. The first general commanded
twenty-five thousand, the last twenty thousand men; but there was
this difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised as to
require a British force to keep down anarchy; whereas, in 1809,
Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army
was acting in conjunction with the British.
Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, under Romana, and
there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards,
under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under
Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were
acting in Gallicia and Leon.
Sir John Moore was urged to throw himself into the heart of Spain,
to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other
military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was
within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and
thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest
military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling
to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless,
feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to
be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a
movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a
great political as well as military purpose.
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