_Major Victor Arentchild to sir J. Cradock, Oporto, March 16._ “General Sylveira has only one regiment with him; and his conduct has been such, that the people have lost all confidence in him, and consider him a traitor. I merely mention this to your excellency as the opinion of the public.... The marquis of Romana’s army is retreating to Orres, in Gallicia, and is, I fear, in a wretched condition. The opinion entertained of him is far from good.” _Mr. commissary Boys to Mr. commissary Rawlings, Almeida, January 13._ “Sir John Moore, with his army, was retreating, and ten thousand men had deserted from the marquis of Romana, and were pillaging the country.” _Lord Castlereagh to marshal Beresford, February 15._ “The Portuguese government having solicited that a British general officer should be appointed to command and organize their army, his majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for this important trust.” _Mr. Canning to Mr. Frere, January 23._ “No effort appears to have been made by the Spaniards, either to second the British operations, or even to defend Ferrol, or save the naval means (whatever they may be) in that harbour.” * * * * * No. VII. EXTRACTS FROM MR FRERE’S CORRESPONDENCE. (N. B. The Italics are not in the original.) _Mr. Frere to sir John Cradock, Seville, March 14._ “Our hope of offensive operations in Aragon is so much diminished by the defeat of general Reding, that I should much doubt whether any reinforcements, such as we could now send there, would enable us to attempt them with the prospect of a degree of success, such as might compensate for the inconvenience liable to arise from the derangement of calculations which may have been formed at home.”--“On the other hand, there seems reason to _apprehend_, that general Soult may at last, in consequence of the resistance he has experienced, _desist from his unaccountable project, of entering Portugal and occupying Gallicia_. His return would, of course, add largely to the disposable and moveable force of the enemy, while it would not increase ours by any force of that description.”--“In this view of the subject there are two points for the employment of a British force; one, _by making a push to drive the enemy from Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns_, while the Asturians should make an effort on their side to occupy Leon and Astorga, thus re-establishing the communications between the northern and southern provinces. The other, by moving from the bridge of Alcantara along the northern bank of the Tagus, in concert with general Cuesta, to attack and _drive the enemy from Toledo, and consequently from Madrid_. In the latter alternative, the British could have the advantage of acting in concert with a disciplined army. They would, likewise, have immediately the start of any reinforcement from the army of general Soult, supposing him to abandon Gallicia for the sake of moving southward; and these