History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
It may be granted that the enemy, with a force from seventeen
to twenty thousand, a considerable portion of which (it is said
five thousand) is cavalry, is directly menacing Oporto, there is
reason to believe that the division at Salamanca, estimated from
nine to twelve thousand, with a powerful force of artillery, is
moving to Ciudad Rodrigo, either for the investment of that place,
or to act in conjunction with general Soult, by an advance into
the Upper Beira. In the present view it is necessary to state,
with the weight it so well deserves, that the united forces of
generals Victor and Sebastiani are, apparently, pursuing general
Cuesta, just retiring before them; but it appears that a part
of the enemies had diverged to Merida, and had spread alarm and
dismay, even to the town of Badajos, on the frontiers of Portugal,
from whence, to the heights of Almeida, or the opposite of Lisbon,
through the whole of the Alemtejo: except the weak garrison of
Elvas, there is nothing to interrupt the immediate passage.
Against such an attempt from the enemy I derive no security from
the contiguity of general Cuesta’s army; for, besides the general
disinclination he has so strongly marked to the British character,
he has other objects to pursue, and his principal wish is to gain
time for the organization of his own force. To a person so well
acquainted with Portugal, and the circumstances of the present
hour, as your excellency is, it is quite superfluous to enter upon
further details, &c. It is only required to lay before you, in
confidence, the exact amount of the British forces, as the real
point upon which the whole subject depends: I may state it at
twelve thousand effective men, to take the field, if the necessary
garrison to maintain Lisbon in some tranquillity, and retain
possession of the maritime forts is left. It may be increased to
fourteen thousand, if these points are risked; but even to gain
the advantage of numbers to so limited a force, I cannot recommend
the measure, for the anarchy that prevails at Oporto, and would
be, perhaps, worse at Lisbon, is more to be dreaded than the
presence of an enemy, and may render all exertion useless. The
necessary means of transport for our army, notwithstanding every
effort, from the earliest moment, are quite inadequate, and not
more than two and a half brigades of artillery (fifteen guns) can
be equipped. To adventure upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred
miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this
moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings
of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the
understanding, and the ultimate view of things. If the British
army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel
the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same; nothing
but the accomplishment will suit the English character; and I
confess that the best reasoning of my judgement, upon every public
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account