and private principle, for the credit of the British army, and the hope of any effectual assistance from the Portuguese nation is, that the British troops should never make one retrograde step: from that moment I will date the extinction of all Portuguese aid, military as well as civil. The British army, from its description, may disregard this common occurrence in war, but I am persuaded, in the present state of the Portuguese army, and with the sentiments of suspicion now alive, all explanation would be vain, and that it would be left to the small body of English, alone, to sustain the whole future conflict. I have now only to state what my inferior judgement points out; and as the arduous situation of command is allotted to me, I must try to execute to the best of my power. I shall remain faithful to my first principles, and persevere in the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus. I invite the co-operation of the Portuguese force, and, under your guidance and auspicious control, I look to a very powerful accession of strength. I am convinced nothing will be done by them in detached parties or in any isolated situation. They will acquire confidence by number, and emulation will arise, a rapid discipline will ensue from their connection with us, and the whole, animated by your presence, will give the best promise of success. Until we have consulted again I shall not say whether our general position should be at Lumiar, extending the whole right to Saccavem, or any other station more in advance. At this moment I have only to express the indispensable circumstance of some fixed basis, upon which the allied army will act, and by our united strength try to counteract the peculiar disadvantages that attends the defence of Portugal from positions that cannot be properly embraced, and always leave some part exposed. Allow me to conclude, with the solemn expression of my own conviction, that nothing will give so much chance of a prosperous result to the arduous scene in which we are engaged (either as to reality or view) as the knowledge to the enemy, that, before he conquers Portugal, he must defeat an army of some magnitude, determined to fight him, and awaiting his approach, unbroken and not exposed to the danger of a false movement. Such a conquest cannot be an easy one, and must prove, if he pursue it, a powerful diversion in favour of Spain. It will gain me the sincerest pleasure, &c. JOHN CRADOCK. * * * * * No. XIII. JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF MARSHAL SOULT. _Captain Brotherton to colonel Donkin, (quarter-master-general,) Lamego, March 17, 1809._ “The enemy has, however, on this occasion, practised those arts which Frenchmen are so expert in--circulating proclamations and insidiously abandoning, for a moment, their usual system of terror, plunder, and desolation, _treating the inhabitants with feigned moderation and kindness_.”