2d. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet’s division, while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or, by a march on the side of Daroca, of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed on Ucles, and that of the marquis of Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly proper to recall Suchet. 2º.--It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of Infantado’s operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his depôts and places of arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined the marquis of Lazan’s troops to his own, he might have formed an entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand regular troops; the insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable; and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege. [Sidenote: Rogniat.] 3º.--From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they did not lose above four thousand men; but their success was owing partly to the errors of their opponents, principally to the destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only were slain in battle. Thirteen convents and churches had been taken; but, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced. Such are the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia. CHAPTER IV. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. [Sidenote: St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations.] It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, to be called the “_7th corps_.” Then appointing general Gouvion St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: “_Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men._”