.. 431, .. 17, _for_ “besieged” _read_ “besiegers.” .. 443, .. 2 from bottom, _for_ “Dikies” _read_ “Dilke.” .. 465, margin, _for_ “Campagne de Français” _read_ “Campagne des Français.” .. 470, .. 9, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” .. 470, .. 17, _for_ “Fons” _read_ “Foz.” .. 512, .. 2, _for_ “eight” _read_ “eighth.” LIST OF PLATES. No. 1. Suchet’s Operations, 1809-10 _to face page_ 10 2. Siege of Gerona _to face page_ 48 3. Areizaga’s Operations, 1809 _to face page_ 84 4. Invasion of Andalusia, 1810 _to face page_ 108 5. Defence of Portugal, 1810 _to face page_ 266 6. Crawfurd’s Operations, 1810 _to face page_ 292 7. Operations on the Mondego, 1810 _to face page_ 334 8. Lines of Torres Vedras, 1810 _to face page_ 358 9. Battle of Barosa, March 5th, 1811 _to face page_ 446 10. Massena’s Retreat, Combat of Sabugal, 1811 _to face page_ 486 11. Battle of Fuentes Onoro _to face page_ 516 12. Battle of Albuera _to face page_ 540 NOTICE. The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the duke of Wellington, marshal Soult, king Joseph, Mr. Stuart,[1] general Graham,[2] general Pelet,[3] general Campbell,[4] captain Codrington,[5] and colonel Cox,[6] together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war. Before the Appendix two papers are inserted, the one a letter from major-general Frederick Ponsonby relative to a passage in the description of the battle of Talavera; the other is an original note by the emperor Napoleon, which I had not seen when I published my first volume. The reader is referred to it as confirmatory of the arguments used by me when objecting to Joseph’s retreat from Madrid. The reader is informed that, in the second volume, Book VI. & VII. should be Book VI., and Book IX. should be Book VIII. HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR. BOOK IX. CHAPTER I. [Sidenote: 1809.] When Gallicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy’s principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellerman’s division at Valladolid, and Bonet’s at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were colaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their career was one of pains and difficulties.