Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that country. The former general premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier, being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c. which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the Tras os Montes. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal “_because the latter was without a military force_,” and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Roriça and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the _state of affairs existing at that moment_, being expressly founded on the _miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military_, Spain also being supposed conquered. [Sidenote: Letter to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 14. 1809. MSS.] [Sidenote: Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.] Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy, which prevailed during sir John Cradock’s time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force re-organized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Gallicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence, lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the enemy then in the Peninsula, provided _an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation_. And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, _although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted_. Lisbon also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts. But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan