History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
“They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms
could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand
men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the
armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within
the last nine months, for the enrollment, organization, and equipment
of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very
insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the
militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this
should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence
in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by
military experience.
“When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to
that pass, _that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility
existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale
as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each
part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French
force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather
than an advantage to the French government_. Thence arose this
question, ‘Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford
any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of
benefit to the allies?’
“It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree
of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the
regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and
they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country
would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which
the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese
had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to
their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually
determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be
certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority
of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced
in military affairs.”
Under these circumstances, and _adverting to the approaching
subjection of Spain_, he demanded to know whether “_the enemy,
bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country
should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off
all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could
be found_. But, under any circumstances, (he said) the British army
could always be embarked in despite of the enemy.”
[Sidenote: Mr. James Moore’s Narrative].
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 12.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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