History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the
idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole
attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of
circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its
defence; yet, the majority yielding to the influence of his brother,
rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and
throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general.
The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by
which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the
compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to
comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many
difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them;
for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and
fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled
politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion.
Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even
thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the
story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but
England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative
of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the
respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to shew how
great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and
with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.
_State of the French._--France victorious, and in a state of the
highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish double the number of
men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many
years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved,
it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies,
disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years,
yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession,
the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of
dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully
demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a baron
Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French
police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter,
influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the
attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government.
The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula
were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious,
and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be
equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which,
though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much
as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most
important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive
king.
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