History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards
never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but
it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his
true situation, when, resisting Napoleon’s policy, he claimed the
treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a
tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor’s. To have
refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic
firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then
to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without
ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in
Napoleon’s path. Joseph’s object was to create a Spanish party for
himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands
of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while
the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen
submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was
it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed
through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for
conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his
throne.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
Now Joseph’s Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon
principle, and who, far from shewing a renegado zeal in favour of the
French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of
those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests
clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies,
they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so
strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended
to fall on the emperor’s troops. Thus civil contention weakened the
military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command
in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon
inspection prove perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the
actual state of affairs.
He suffered, or as some eager to lower a great man’s genius to their
own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals
and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those
disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point
to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in
regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that
the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole.
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