Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawfurd’s staff, burst the prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops forced their way over the bridge; yet, at the other end, the up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank, and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria. Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions abundant; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; and, at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ancle deep, with rum, the light division and Pack’s Portuguese brigade, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor. Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot; and some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy’s inactivity, restored order amongst the allies; while Massena’s conduct, the reverse of the English general’s, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste; and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months: and, during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost. OBSERVATIONS. 1º. “_Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike._” This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon’s letter of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling’s operations should be judged. 2º. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a “_a vigorous attack_.”