History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom
four hundred were armed with English muskets and furnished with three
pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties
attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the
Lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança
would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their
allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of
ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the
Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the
governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his
garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.
This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy’s attention, and lord
Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the
Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured,
peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This
retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and
consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming
from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the
alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general
Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill
spared from the Lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all
the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and
patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere,
kept a strict watch upon the enemy’s movements.
Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number
of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious
inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the
English Admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England
in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this
time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before,
stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada,
he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was
in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary
lines on that side.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.]
Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was
the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied
that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been
relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the
line deserted between April and December, and the militia and
ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for, as
no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force
against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want
became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British
stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 10.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account