History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the
Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to
fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the
Regency, and lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the
Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in
the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his
passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after
this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to
resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the
feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch,
whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion
to declare that “he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the
people which were evidently for no other purpose than _to nourish the
war in the heart of the kingdom_.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 7.]
But it was his and his coadjutors’ criminal conduct that really
nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in
time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena
could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat
would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures
previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas
now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Gollegao, and Santarem
was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but
little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the
deep mortification to find that his well considered design was
frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect
the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe
that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions
until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him.
“_It is heart-breaking_,” was the bitter reflection of the British
general, “_to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy
and folly_.”
CHAPTER X.
The increasing strength of the works, and the report of British
deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced
Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great
reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular
forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to
despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage
of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with
an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have
long made war, the French general maintained his forward position,
until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then,
reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in
which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched
more distant countries for food.
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