History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
“The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those
which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but
(adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of
cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and
arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency
even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and
the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great
victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the
defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.
“But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar
advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate
the duke Del Parque’s intended operations. He could march a part, or
the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the
different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each
for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the
enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford,
with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult,
which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which
was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the
inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them
from destruction.
“In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced
position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would
the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one
of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate,
or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative
efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the
commencement of the argument, forbad a general co-operation with
any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could
follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions
performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after
the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be
forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought
never to have quitted.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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