In Grenada the fourth corps, which, after the departure of Sebastiani, was commanded by general Laval, had two distinct tasks to fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army; the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpuxaras, against the efforts of the Partidas of those mountains, against the Serranos of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and from Algeziras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of Mahi, Freire, and Montijo to aid the Valencian operations, secured the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a small force, having pushed his partizan excursions rashly, was killed in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered. Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the Partidas, who were more numerous there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La Mancha. Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos, an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the way of Truxillo; and there the fifth French corps, commanded by Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps of general Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo’s Spanish army, which was becoming numerous and bold. Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana, but this exposed his troops to Hill’s enterprises; and that bold and vigilant commander having ten thousand excellent troops, and being well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour. Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus; the construction of the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as occasion required. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 3.]