In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult, from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of Portugal, quartered in the valley of the Tagus, could by moving into Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; lord Wellington had therefore with forecast of such an event, designed that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura. [Sidenote: Intercepted despatch of marshal Soult, 1812. MSS.] This bold and skilful stroke was baulked by the never-ceasing misconduct of the Portuguese government, with respect to means of transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill’s enterprise were thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced, because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the allies’ march, and had made no change in his extended quarters, indicating a design to aid Soult; Hill also soon drove Drouet back towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida, intercepted the line of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in the enemy’s papers. “So calculated,” said Soult, “was this affair (the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of operations and the irresolution of Marmont.” Nor when the duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did lord Wellington’s delay in Estremadura arise from any imprudence; he had good grounds for believing, that the French would not attempt the latter place, and that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the Tormes reached him, he sent captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated scouting officer, to watch Marmont’s proceedings. That gentleman, in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality predominated, very rapidly executed his mission; and the interesting nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a digression concerning them.