But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for Wellington’s merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn, these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time, or of conjunction to accelerate the gain of his object. Now all armies come to the siege of a town with great advantages; for first the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants; they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary’s time and attack, their losses seem more numerous, in proportion to their forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain a fortress eventually, without the aid of a succouring army; their ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour, and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their own sufferings.