But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted while Badajos remained in the enemy’s possession? If Wellington had advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre, the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal coming down to Badajos, could have either operated against the rear of the allies, or against Lisbon. Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take it? By regular or by irreglar operations? For the first a certain time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What then would have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to chase them from the Peninsula? How was it to be expected that England would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of final success? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in Parliament? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then was Wellington’s only resource. To strike without regard to rules, trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general who had undertaken on his own judgement to fight the battle of the Peninsula? Was he to give force to the light declamation of the hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British farther into Spain! was he, at such a moment, to place the probable loss of a few thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and by declining the chance offered, shew that he despaired of success himself? What if he failed? He would not have been, save the loss of a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case, he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of England! APPENDIX. APPENDIX. JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE OF SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS. No. I. SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES. _Captain Irby to Mr. Croft._