1º. He directed Silveira and D’Urban, who were on the frontier of Tras os Montes, to file along the Douro, menace the enemy’s right flank and rear, and form a link of connection with the Gallician army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, as soon as the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile sir Home Popham’s expedition was to commence its operations, in concert with the seventh Spanish army, on the coast of Biscay and so draw Caffarelli’s divisions from the succour of Marmont. 2º. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king, or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, in concert with the Murcian army. 3º. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington trusted, 1º. to the garrison of Gibraltar, and to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops, in the Isla de Leon; 2º. to insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, where Echevaria going from Cadiz, by the way of Ayamonte, with three hundred officers, was to organize the Partidas of that district, as Mendizabel had done those of the northern parts; 3º. to Ballesteros’s army, but he ever dreaded the rashness of this general, who might be crushed in a moment, which would have endangered Hill and rendered any success in the north nugatory. It was this fear of Ballesteros’s rashness that caused Wellington to keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult’s resolution to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though Hill should cross the Tagus, was wise and military. For though Drouet would undoubtedly have given the king and Marmont a vast superiority in Castile, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington. Hill could at any time have misled Drouet by crossing the bridge of Alcantara, and returning again, when Drouet had passed the bridge of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general’s march would then have led to nothing, for either Hill could have joined Wellington, by a shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have taken advantage of his absence from Estremadura; or Wellington could have retired within the Portuguese frontier, rendering Drouet’s movement to Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the bridge of Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight’s march and overwhelmed Soult in Andalusia. The great error of the king’s plan was that it depended upon exact co-operation amongst persons who jealous of each other were far from obedient to himself, and whose marches it was scarcely possible to time justly; because the armies were separated by a great extent of country and their lines of communication were external long and difficult, while their enemy was acting on internal short and easy lines. Moreover the French correspondence, continually intercepted by the Partidas, was brought to Wellington, and the knowledge thus gained by one side and lost by the other caused the timely reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping