History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
of Palombini’s Italian division from Madrid for three weeks; an event
which in the sequel proved of vital consequence, inasmuch as it
prevented the army of the centre moving until after the crisis of the
campaign had passed.
Hill’s exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state of the army
of the centre, having in a manner isolated the army of Portugal,
the importance of Gallicia and the Asturias, with respect to the
projected operations of lord Wellington, was greatly increased. For
the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon the rear of Marmont,
and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching through
the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de
Santander and there join the seventh army. Hence the necessity of
keeping Bonet in the Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes, was
become imperative, and Marmont, following Napoleon’s instructions,
had fortified the different posts in Castile, but his army was too
widely spread, and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right
instead of concentrating on the left near Baños.
The duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the Tormes and Douro, as
his lines of defence, and never doubting that he was the object of
attack, watched the augmentation of Wellington’s forces and magazines
with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable magazines
himself, and the king had formed others for him at Talavera and
Segovia, yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy
a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding them until
June. When he heard of the restoration of the bridge of Alcantara,
and of magazines being formed at Caceres, he observed that the latter
would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object;
and although not well placed for an army acting against himself, were
admirably placed for an army which having fought in Castile should
afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported
at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be secured
by removing the temporary restorations. Wherefore, judging that Hill
would immediately rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle, that, with
a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought near the Tormes, he
desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in
movement; and he prayed the king to have guns, and a pontoon train
sent from Madrid that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by
the Puerto Pico.
[Sidenote: See Plan, No. 3.]
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