History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Clauzel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand
men could be reorganised, but in this number he did not include the
stragglers and marauders who always take advantage of a defeat to
seek their own interest; a reference to the French loss proves that
there were nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact
Clauzel did in a fortnight reorganise twenty thousand infantry, two
thousand cavalry and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five
thousand stragglers and marauders. In fine no soldiers rally quicker
after a defeat, than the French, and hence as Joseph brought to
Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men of which above
two thousand were horsemen, forty thousand infantry, and more than
six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery, might then have been
rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli’s divisions. Nor
would Madrid have been meanwhile exposed to an insurrection, nor to
the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington’s army; for the
two thousand men, sent by Suchet, had arrived in that capital on the
30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity,
six or seven thousand other troops who could have been united at
the Retiro, to protect that dépôt and the families attached to the
intrusive court.
Thus Wellington without committing any fault, would have found a more
powerful army than Marmont’s, again on the Duero, and capable of
renewing the former operations with the advantage of former errors as
warning beacons. But his own army would not have been so powerful
as before, for the reinforcements sent from England did not even
suffice to replace the current consumption of men; and neither the
fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain
the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined
since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and
wounded, was above eight thousand men, and the number of sick was
rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may therefore be said
that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington the king poisoned
the wound. The English general had fore-calculated all these superior
resources of the enemy, and it was only Marmont’s flagrant fault, on
the 22d, that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought
it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him
late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes
of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command,
shewed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone,
the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and
watchful, but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the
rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than
Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only
to accept this glory, as an earnest of greater things.
BOOK XIX.
CHAPTER I.
[Sidenote: 1812.]
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