As Wellington’s operations had now deeply affected the French affairs in the distant provinces, it is necessary again to revert to the general progress of the war, lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by clearing all the centre of Spain, had reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. For Palombini’s division having joined the army of the centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north; and when Clauzel had led back the vanquished army of Portugal to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France, and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army in two parts, and though, by the advantage of his central position, he retained the initial power, both of movement and concentration, his lines of communication were become long, and weak because the enemy was powerful at either flank. Wherefore on his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy’s rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn. EASTERN OPERATIONS. [Sidenote: See Book XVII. Chap. II.] [Sidenote: Captain Addington’s correspondence, MSS.] [Sidenote: History of the conspiracies against the French army in Catalonia, published at Barcelona, 1813.]