Roche’s corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government delayed to place it under general Maitland, and hence it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, then returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of general Maitland’s arrival off Palamos, was, under the command of Joseph O’Donel, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham’s levy remained, but when inspected by the quarter-master general Donkin it was found in a raw state, scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera. The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham’s and Roche’s men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure, nor upon the delivery of the stores, and Roche’s proceedings on this last head, whether justly or unjustly I know not, were very generally and severely censured. Whittingham acknowledged that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops, and though the captain-general Coupigny desired their departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so very strongly, that he finally assented and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of all nations on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs. [Sidenote: Notes by general Maitland, MSS.] [Sidenote: General Donkin’s papers, MSS.] Maitland’s first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring that the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it; the other generals shewed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy’s disposable troops at fifteen thousand, and his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and even that number he said he could with difficulty feed or provide with ammunition. Sarzfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet’s moveable column, eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential in any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including Suchet’s column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet’s column and of the garrisons and Miguelettes in the enemy’s service.