No insurrection of the Somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance that such an event would happen, as the French were descried conducting convoys along the shore with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Taragona after investment, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good troops, which number could be doubled in a few days; the Catalans could not so soon unite and join Maitland’s force, and there was a general, although apparently, an unjust notion abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared also, that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus Wellington’s battering train and even the safety of the army would be involved in an enterprize promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed by captain Codrington to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland also was farther swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the Somatenes had not voluntarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step, when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia with intent to attack that place, after a project, furnished by the quarter-master general Donkin and in unison with lord Wellington’s plan of operations; but Maitland, during the voyage, changed his mind and proceeded at once to Alicant. [Sidenote: Captain Codrington’s papers, MSS.]