not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why retreat at all? Where,” exclaimed this able warrior, “where is the harm though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?” “Your majesty,” he continued, “should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible, the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia, even though to do so should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If the army of Portugal comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain, because while Burgos defends itself, that army can keep on the right of the Ebro and the emperor will take measures for its succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms in Andalusia; and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled in that province the theatre of war is changed! The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive battle may be delivered without fear at the gates of Lisbon. March then with the army of the centre upon the Despenas Peros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro and famine will drive you thence before the emperor can, from the distant Russia, provide a remedy; his affairs even in that country will suffer by the blow, and America dismayed by our misfortunes will perhaps make peace with England.” [Sidenote: Appendix No. 4.]