History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Neither the king’s genius, nor his passions, would permit him to
understand the grandeur and vigour of this conception. To change even
simple lines of operation suddenly, is at all times a nice affair,
but thus to change the whole theatre of operations and regain the
initial movements after a defeat, belongs only to master spirits in
war. Now the emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and
Joseph would not understand this save as applied to the recovery of
Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France; as if Wellington
could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced
Lisbon; in fine he could see nothing but his lost capital on one
side, and a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily
repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing that his plan could only
be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility
of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but
mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with
anger at such a termination to all his political and military
labours, his feelings over-mastered his judgment. Instead of tracing
the king’s rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness of
the monarch’s military genius, he judged it part of a design to
secure his own fortune at the expense of his brother, an action quite
foreign to Joseph’s honest and passionate nature. Wherefore making
known this opinion to six generals, who were sworn to secrecy, unless
interrogated by the Emperor, he wrote to the French minister of war
expressing his doubts of the king’s loyalty towards the emperor, and
founding them on the following facts.
1º. That the extent of Marmont’s defeat had been made known to him
only by the reports of the enemy, and the king, after remaining for
twenty-three days, without sending any detailed information of the
operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively
engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it
was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion Soult
said he could not subscribe, yet being unable absolutely to disobey
the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must finally lead
to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it
would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even
in the Castiles.
2º. This operation ruinous in itself was insisted upon at a time,
when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed, that Joseph’s ambassador at
the court of Petersburgh, had joined the Prussian army in the field;
that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in
the Isla de Leon; that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made
a treaty with England and had demanded of the Cortez a guard of
Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an
officer sent with a flag of truce to the English admiral; finally
that Moreau and Blucher were at Stockholm, and the aide-de-camp of
the former was in London.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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