On the 11th the king coming up from Medina del Campo reorganized his army. That is, he united the army of the centre with the army of the south, placing the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli had before this returned to Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and as Souham, besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; and as the king also, had left a garrison in the Retiro, scarcely ninety thousand combatants of all arms were assembled on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had at least one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idle, for the country was exhausted of provisions, the soldiers were already wanting bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother’s greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage. [Sidenote: Appendix, No. 9.] Jourdan with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He had observed that Wellington’s position was composed of three parts, namely, the right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; the left, separated from the centre by the Tormes, at San Christoval; the whole distance being about fifteen miles. Now the Tormes was still fordable in many places above Salamanca, and hence he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at day-break, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force Wellington to a decisive battle. [Sidenote: French Official correspondence, MSS.]