History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Souham’s pursuit after the cavalry combat at Vente de Pozo was
feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, “no troops were
ever less pressed by an enemy.” The king’s orders were however
positive not to fight, and as the English general continually
offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to
do mischief. Soult’s pursuit of Hill, which was also remarkably
cautious, arose from other motives. He was not desirous of a battle,
and until the Guadarama was passed, Hill had the larger force, for
then only was the whole French army united. The duke of Dalmatia
wished to have marched in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving
only a small corps, or a detachment of Suchet’s army, on the Cuenca
road; but the king united the whole of the army of the centre, his
own guards and seven thousand men of the army of the south, on the
Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications except
by Taracon. Soult therefore advanced towards the Tagus with only
thirty-five thousand men, and from commissariat difficulties and
other obstacles, he was obliged to move by divisions, which followed
each other at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at
Valdemoro, his rear-guard not having reached Ocaña was two marches
distant. The danger of this movement is evident. Hill might have
turned and driven him over the Tagus; or if his orders had permitted
him to act offensively at first, he might, after leaving a small
corps on the Upper Tagus, to watch the king, have passed that river
at Toledo, and without abandoning his line of operations by the
valley of the Tagus, have attacked Soult while on the march towards
Ocaña. The latter in despite of his numerous cavalry must then have
fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged
the whole campaign.
The duke of Dalmatia, who thought Ballesteros was with Hill,
naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious
disposition of the French army, neither could that disposition be
changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross
roads, and because Souham had been taught that the king would meet
him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine Soult had learned to respect
his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp
embraced the whole machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle
where a defeat would, from the unsettled state of the French affairs,
have lost the whole Peninsula. Wellington had Portugal to fall back
upon, but the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account