History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but
it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between
Wellington’s retreat and that of sir John Moore. This last-named
general marched from Portugal into the north of Spain, with the
political view of saving Andalusia, by drawing on himself the
French power, having before-hand declared that he expected to be
overwhelmed. In like manner Wellington moved into the same country,
to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of
the enemy; like Moore declaring also before-hand, that the political
object being gained, his own military position would be endangered.
Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by
superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana’s Spanish
army, but he found it a burthen; so also Wellington was impeded, not
assisted, by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.
Moore having approached Soult, and menaced Burgos, was forced to
retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and
towards his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos was
obliged to raise the siege and retire, lest the king, coming through
Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was
only followed by Soult to the Esla, Wellington was only followed
by Souham to the Duero. The one general looked to the mountains of
Gallicia for positions which he could maintain, but the apathy of the
Spanish people, in the south, permitted Napoleon to bring up such
an overwhelming force that this plan could not be sustained; the
other general had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the
defection of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a power
that further retreat became necessary.
Moore’s soldiers at the commencement of the operation evinced want of
discipline, they committed great excesses at Valderas, and disgraced
themselves by their inebriety at Bembibre and Villa Franca. In
like manner Wellington’s soldiers broke the bonds of discipline,
disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the retreat
from the Puente Larga to Madrid; and they committed excesses every
where. Moore stopped behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to
restore order, and to enable his commissariat to remove the stores;
Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes.
The one general was immediately turned on his left, because the
bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other
general was also turned on his left, because the bridge of Palencia
was abandoned unbroken to Foy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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