History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
My plan, as it is invidiously and falsely called, was simply a
reasoning upon the advantages of sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan, and
the calculation of days by the reviewer is mere mysticism. Sir
Arthur wished sir John Moore to go to Santarem, and if sir Arthur’s
recommendation had been followed, sir John Moore, who, instead
of taking five days as this writer would have him do, actually
disembarked the greatest part of his troops in the Mondego in half
a day, that is before one o’clock on the 22d, might have been at
Santarem the 27th even according to the reviewer’s scale of march,
ten miles a day! Was he to remain idle there, if the enemy did not
abandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that city? If he
could stop Junot’s retreat either at Santarem or in the Alemtejo, a
cavalry country, he could surely as safely operate towards Saccavem,
a strong country. What was sir A. Wellesley’s observation on that
head? “If the march to Mafra had been made as I had ordered it on
the 21st of August in the morning, the position of Torres Vedras
would have been turned, and there was no position in the enemy’s
possession, excepting that in our front at Cabeça de Montechique
and those in rear of it. And I must observe to the court that if
sir John Moore’s corps had gone to Santarem as proposed as soon
as it disembarked in the Mondego, there would have been no great
safety in those positions, if it was, as it turned out to be, in
our power to beat the French.” Lo! then, my plan is not at variance
with sir Arthur Wellesley’s object. But the whole of the reviewer’s
sophistry is directed, both as to this march and that to Mafra, not
against me, but through me against the duke of Wellington whom the
writer dare not attack openly; witness his cunning defence of that
“_wet-blanket_” counsel which stopped sir Arthur Wellesley’s pursuit
of Junot from the field of Vimiero. Officer of rank! Aye, it sounds
grandly! but it was a shrewd thing of Agesilaus when any one was
strongly recommended to him to ask “who will vouch for the voucher?”
Passing now from the officer of rank, I affirm, notwithstanding Mr.
Southey’s “magnificent chapters” and sir Charles Vaughan’s “brief
and elegant work,” that the statement about Palafox and Zaragoza is
correct. My authority is well known to sir Charles Vaughan, and is
such as he is not likely to dispute; that gentleman will not, I feel
well assured, now guarantee the accuracy of the tales he was told at
Zaragoza. But my real offence is not the disparagement of Palafox, it
is the having spoiled some magnificent romances, present or to come;
for I remembered the Roman saying about the “Lying Greek fable,” and
endeavoured so to record the glorious feats of my countrymen, that
even our enemies should admit the facts. And they have hitherto done
so, with a magnanimity becoming brave men who are conscious of merit
in misfortune, thus putting to shame the grovelling spirit that would
make calumny and vituperation the test of patriotism.
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