In this state of affairs, and when a quarrel had arisen between Bernadotte and the Saxon king (for the people of that country were ill-disposed towards the French), it is evident that a large English army appearing in the north of Germany would have gathered around it all the people and armies of the north, and accordingly Stadion proposed a landing in the Weser and the Elbe. Now England had at that time the great armament which went to Walcheren, the army under Wellington in the Peninsula, and that under sir John Stuart in Sicily, that is to say, she had about 80,000 or 90,000 men disposable; and yet so contriving were the ministers, that they kept Wellington too weak in Spain, Stuart too strong in Sicily; and instead of acting in the north of Germany where such a great combination awaited them, they sent their most powerful force to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, where the only diversion they caused was the bringing together a few thousand national guards from the nearest French departments. And this the reviewer calls ‘_the forming a combination of those states in Europe which still retained some degree of independence and magnanimity to resist the ambition of a conqueror_.’ What a profound, modest, and, to use a Morning Post compound, not-at-all-a-flagitious writer this reviewer is. Well, notwithstanding this grand ‘_combination_,’ things did not turn out well. The Austrians changed their first plan of campaign in several particulars. Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly appeared at the head of his army, which, greatly inferior in number, and composed principally of German contingents, was not very well disposed towards him; and yet, such was the stupendous power of this man’s genius and bravery, he in a few days by a series of movements unequalled in skill by any movement known in military records, broke through the Austrian power, separated her armies, drove them in disorder before him, and seized Vienna; and but for an accident, one of those minor accidents so frequent in war, which enabled the archduke Charles to escape over the Danube at Ratisbon, he would have terminated this gigantic contest in ten days. The failure there led to the battle of Esling, where the sudden swell of the Danube again baffled him and produced another crisis, which might have been turned to his hurt if the English army had been in the north of Germany; but it was then perishing amongst the stagnant ditches of Walcheren, and the only combination of the English ministers to be discovered was a combination of folly, arrogance, and conceit. I have now done with the review. Had all the objections contained in it been true, it would have evinced the petty industry of a malicious mind more than any just or generous interest in the cause of truth; but being, as I have demonstrated, false even in the minutest particular, I justly stigmatise it as remarkable only for malignant imbecility and systematic violation of truth. * * * * *