The French were now very strong. Suchet unmolested for forty days after the battle of Castalla, had improved his defensive works, chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, rehorsed his cavalry and artillery, and prepared for new operations, without losing the advantage of foraging the fertile districts immediately in front of the Xucar. On the other hand lord William Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham’s cavalry, and Roche’s division, were left at Alicant, the force actually embarked to attack Taragona, including a fresh English regiment from Carthagena, scarcely exceeded fourteen thousand present under arms. Of these, less than eight thousand were British or German, and the horsemen were only seven hundred. Yet the armament was formidable, for the battering train was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines previously collected at Ivica, and the naval squadron, under admiral Hallowel, consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. There was however no cordiality between general Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his quarter-master-general Donkin, nor between Donkin and the admiral; subordinate officers also, in both services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation, and there was in no quarter a clear understanding of lord Wellington’s able plan for the operations. [Sidenote: Vol. V. p. 495.] While Del Parque’s army was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elio or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of the allies’ intentions, although the strength of the battering-train at Alicant indicated some siege of importance. He however recalled Pannetier’s brigade from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on the road to Tortoza; and at the same time, knowing Clauzel was then warring down the partidas in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe, and drew Severoli’s Italian brigade from thence, leaving only the garrisons, and a few thousand men under general Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza: and this was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel in the valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some reinforcements, wherefore, after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts required by Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into the field. He was however very unquiet, and notwithstanding Clauzel’s operations, in fear for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover now, for the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in Valencia. [Sidenote: June.]