Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the following points. 1º. That he did not know with any certainty until the night of the 11th that Suchet was near. 2º. That the fall of Taragona being the principal object, and the drawing of the French from Valencia the accessary, he persisted in the siege, because he expected reinforcements from Sicily, and desired to profit from the accidents of war. 3º. That looking only to the second object, the diversion would have been incomplete, if the siege had been raised sooner, or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores after he despaired of success. 4º. That he dared not risk a battle to save his battering train, because Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the danger of losing his army was apparent, and then made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible, though inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression, discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate. The fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as in the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For first, however numerous the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. The arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was too uncertain for reasonable calculation, and it was scarcely possible for the governor of Taragona, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores or guns were being landed; still less could he judge so timeously of Murray’s final intention by that fact, as to advertize Suchet that Taragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the allies’ camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first week. And the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when the feeble operations of the general, and the universal discontent, furnished surer guides for their reports. Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th and only deferred it, after seeing the admiral, from his natural vacillation. It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained certain information of Suchet’s advance on the night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th through various channels he knew the French marshal was in march for Tortoza, and that his advanced guard menaced the Col de Balaguer. The approach of Maurice Mathieu on the other side was also known; he should therefore have been prepared to raise the siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. Why were they lost at all? They could not be saved, he said, without risking a battle in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted by Wellington’s instructions, which on that head, referred only to the duke Del Parque and Elio.