His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would have lent his right to the enemy who pivotted upon St. Jean Pied de Port could operate against his flank. His arrangements for supply, and intercourse with his depôts and hospitals, would have been more difficult and complicated, and as the enemy possessed all the French and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain one, at least, before the season closed, was absolute if he would not resign his communications with the interior of Spain. Then long marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops destroyed their shoes and used up their musquet ammunition; and the loss of men had been great, especially of British in the second division where their proportion to foreign troops was become too small. The difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have been increased by entering an enemy’s state, because the English system did not make war support war and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally it was France that was to be invaded, France in which every person was a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organised under men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war but who had all served more or less. Beyond the Adour the army could not advance, and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune befel the allies in Catalonia so as to leave Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeluna, or if Soult profiting from the possession of San Jean Pied de Port should turn the right flank of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary, and however short would be dangerous from the hostility and warlike disposition of the people directed in a military manner. These reasons joined to the fact, that a forward position, although offering better communications from right to left, would have given the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which must until the fortresses fell hold a defensive and somewhat extended line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after the action of the 2d of August. The questions were distinct. The one was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions, the other was simply whether Wellington should profit of his own victory and the enemy’s distresses; and in this view the objections above-mentioned, save the want of shoes the scarcity of ammunition and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last particulars the allies were not so badly off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as to cripple the army, wherefore if the advantage to be gained was worth the effort it was an error to halt. [Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.] [Sidenote: Soult’s Official Report, MSS.]