To succeed however it was essential either to beat general Hill off-hand and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of Marcalain, or to secure the defence of the French left in such a solid manner that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither was effected. The French general indeed brought an overwhelming force to bear upon Hill, and drove him from the road of Irurzun, but he did not crush him, because that general fought so strongly and retired with such good order, that beyond the loss of the position no injury was sustained. Meanwhile the left wing of the French was completely beaten, and thus the advantage gained on the right was more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the ground occupied by his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was nearly impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both flanks at the same time, but neither Picton’s advance into the valley of Zubiri on Foy’s left, nor Cole’s front attack on that general, nor Byng’s assault upon the village of Sauroren, would have seriously damaged the French without the sudden and complete success of general Inglis beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass secure of their junction with Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack became decisive. It is clear therefore that the key of the defence was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments Clauzel should have placed two divisions there. 8º. Lord Wellington’s quick perception and vigorous stroke on the 30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he certainly was not master of all the bearings of the French general’s operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill’s danger nor the difficulties of Soult, otherwise it is probable that he would have put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the pass of Doña Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence his march that day until 8 o’clock, and it has been shewn that even with the help of the seventh division he was too weak against the heavy mass of the retreating French army. The faults and accidents which baffled Wellington’s after operations have been sufficiently touched upon in the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his victorious career, when Soult’s army was broken and flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and all things seemed favourable for the invasion of France.