The code of maritime law, adopted in the Declaration at Paris of 1856, as well as the Declaration in London of 1909, had been framed in the interests of unmaritime nations. The British plenipotentiaries had agreed to these laws on the theory that in any war of the future Britain would be neutral. The rights of neutrals had been greatly increased. A blockade was difficult to enforce, for the right of a blockading power to capture a blockade runner did not cover the whole period of her voyage, and was confined to ships of the blockading force. A ship carrying contraband could only be condemned if the contraband formed more than half its cargo. A belligerent warship could destroy a neutral vessel without taking it into a port for a judgment. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag was presumed to be valid, if effected more than thirty days before the outbreak of war. Belligerents in neutral vessels on the high seas were exempt from capture. The Emden could justify its sinking of British ships, but the English were handicapped in their endeavor to prevent neutral ships from carrying supplies to Germany. But Germany had become a law unto itself. And England found it necessary in retaliation to issue orders in council which made nugatory many of the provisions of the maritime code. The protests of the American Government and those of other neutrals were treated with the greatest consideration, and every endeavor was made that no real injustice should be done. When America itself later entered the war these differences of opinion disappeared from public view. CHAPTER II THE SUBLIME PORTE As soon as the diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia had been broken, the Turkish Grand Vizier informed the diplomatic corps in Constantinople that Turkey would remain neutral in the conflict. The declaration was not formal, for war had not yet been declared. The policy of Turkey, as represented in the ministerial paper, _Tasfiri-Efkiar_, was as follows: