Quite independently of her long-standing friendship with England it would be suicide to Italy in her geographical position to enter a war which should permit her coast to be attacked by the English and French navies, and her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was well known in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers upon war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from the Triple Alliance, and planning to use the entire forces of France against Germany. A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a consideration of the origin of the Triple Alliance. After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of France, considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use his own words, “bleeding her white.” He found, however, that if this were attempted France would be joined by Russia and England and he gave up this plan. In order, however, to render France powerless he planned an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league between Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia, however, remained cool. Her Pan-Slavonic sympathies were opposed to the interests of Germany. Bismarck, therefore, determined, without losing the friendship of Russia, to persuade Italy to join in the continental combination. Italy, at the time, was the least formidable of the six great powers, but Bismarck foresaw that she could be made good use of in such a combination. At that time Italy, just after the completion of Italian unity, found herself in great perplexity. Her treatment of the Pope had brought about the hostility of Roman Catholics throughout the world. She feared both France and Austria, who were strong Catholic countries, and hardly knew where to look for friends. The great Italian leader at the time was Francesco Crispi, who, beginning as a Radical and a conspirator, had become a constitutional statesman. Bismarck professed the greatest friendship for Crispi, and gave Crispi to understand that he approved of Italy’s aspirations on the Adriatic and in Tunis. The next year, however, at the Berlin Congress, Italy’s interests were ignored, and finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the great indignation of the Italians. It has been shown in more recent times that the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to Bismarck’s instigation. The Italians having been roused to wrath, Bismarck proceeded to offer them a place in the councils of the Triple Alliance. It was an easy argument that such an alliance would protect them against France, and no doubt it was promised that it would free them from the danger of attack by Austria. England, at the time, was isolated, and Italy continued on the best understanding with her.