right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the land. But that from the first, and long before he left Capetown for Natal, the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted from at page 179), in the former of which he speaks of the delay caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other reasons, it “will increase our means of defending whatever we may find to be our unquestionable rights;” and in the latter he says again: “I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being able to strengthen your hands.” These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere’s desire to be “ready to defend ourselves against further aggressions;” but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand. Extracts from these statements run as follows: “I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal, Zululand, and Natal.”—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45). “His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the _Active_ should remain here, in order to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable.”—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32). “The object of my visit here was ... to make myself acquainted with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for co-operating with Her Majesty’s land forces by landing troops or stores.[116] “It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer’s desire) to have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea, also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward of the Tugela by sea.” The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus the slightest _law_, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war, as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction, might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of cattle, to propitiate the Government.