“Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term specified, Her Majesty’s troops will advance. But in consideration of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn’s letter to comply with the demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the term of thirty days without, in the meantime, taking any hostile action unless it is provoked by the Zulus.” And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time stipulated. The cattle, he said, “are still being collected, and it will be impossible now for them to be up in time.” John Dunn in the same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people, saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force should they be required. Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37), by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308, p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with the English, the Zulu king and people, or the major part of it, were thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded, all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts, preparations on our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that time, no grounds whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice, and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue, without the loss of honour, men, and money which England has since sustained.