On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: “All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal[120] when the several columns move forward.... The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just sufficient to enable them to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26). The directions for the various columns were, briefly—No. 1. To cross the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, to form a depôt, well entrenched. No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe. The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial Government; but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2 Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion to remain at Middle Drift. No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired; to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched, as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up communication with the columns on left and right. No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. “The civil authorities on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted.”—(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 223). In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi, and Rorke’s Drift to Swaziland; but “to delay its advance toward the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn’s column to assist it against Sirayo.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28). On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with him that he should “occupy himself with the tribes in his front and left flank,” till the General was “ready to advance to Izipezi Hill” (_ibid._ p. 42). By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage.