The native members of the court, also, were made to sign a judgment, the contents of which had been “interpreted” to them, and their signatures “witnessed,” by which the prisoner is declared to have been “convicted, on clear evidence, of several acts, for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world.” The absurdity of this is palpable, since it was impossible that these men should know anything of the law of any civilised land; it is plain, therefore, that in pretending to agree with assertions, of the meaning of which they were totally ignorant, they were under some strong influence, such as prejudice against the prisoner, undue fear of the Supreme Chief, or desire to please him—one of them being “Head Induna of the Natal Government,” and another the “Induna to the Secretary for Native Affairs.” To turn to these crimes, “for some of which he would be liable to forfeit his life under the law of every civilised country in the world”—to which statement His Excellency the Supreme Chief, the Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Administrators of Native Law have also signed their names—we find that the charges run as follows: 1. “Setting at naught the authority of the magistrate in a manner[24] _not indeed sufficiently palpable to warrant the use of forcible coercion to our_ (civilised) laws and customs.” Which charge we may at once dismiss as absurd. 2. “Permitting, or _probably_ encouraging, his tribe to possess fire-arms, and retain them contrary to law.” 3. “With reference to these fire-arms, defying the authority of the magistrate, and once insulting the messenger.” 4. “Refusing to appear before” the Supreme Chief when summoned, “excusing his refusal by evasion and falsehood,” and “insulting his messenger.” 5. “Directing his cattle and other effects to be taken out of the colony under an armed escort.” 6. Causing the death of Her Majesty’s subjects at the Bushman’s River Pass. It is plain to the most casual observation that none of the first five accusations, even if fully proved, refer to crimes punishable by death in any civilised land; and it is difficult to see how the Chief could reasonably be considered responsible for the sixth and last, seeing that the action took place in his absence, against his express commands, and to his great regret. Returning to the five first-named offences, we find that the statements contained in the second and third charges are the only proofs alleged of the truth of the first—to which therefore we need give no further attention—the magistrate himself stating that “this was the first time the prisoner ever refused to appear before him when ordered to do so;” and this was the first time for more than twenty years that he had been reported for any fault whatever.